The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution by Pirsig, Maynard E.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1956
The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article
of the Minnesota Constitution
Maynard E. Pirsig
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pirsig, Maynard E., "The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution" (1956). Minnesota Law Review.
1938.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1938
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE JUDICIARY
ARTICLE OF THE MINNESOTA CONSITrUTION
IMAYNARD E. PIRSIG*
Twenty years of agitation over constitutional revision in the
state of Minnesota has culminated in a proposal for the revision of
Article VI dealing with the courts and judiciary of the state. This
will be voted upon at the general election in the fall of 1956.1
Those twenty years have seen two other proposals for revision
of this article which were brought forward but which failed to enlist
the support necessary. In 1941, the Minnesota judicial Council
appointed a committee headed by Justice Charles Loring and desig-
nated the "Committee on the Unification of the Courts." Some
twenty distinguished practicing lawyers and judges of Minnesota
made up the Committee. In 1942 it submitted its report with a pro-
posed revision of Article VI. Something of the vision and perspec-
tive of the Committee can be gathered from the statement of Justice
Loring which accompanied the report:
"It was the view of the committee that the principal weak-
ness in our present judicial system arises from (a) lack of unity
and administrative supervision in our courts; (b) the fettering
of the courts by lack of complete and certain rule-making power,
and (c) the unsatisfactory method of selection and the shortness
of tenure of our judges....
"The explanation of the inadequacy of our present judicial
system lies in the fact that it was adopted to meet the needs of an
earlier day having a simpler civilization and very different eco-
nomic and social conditions. It has never been adjusted to the
tempo of the present day, with all of its economic and social
complexities. The constantly increasing demands upon the
judiciary have been met by the piecemeal additions of new
tribunals and more judges. Little attention has been paid to
coordination or the orderly development of what could properly
be called a judicial system. Rather lack of system became the rule.
"It is time that our whole judicial structure should be over-
hauled and modernized. That is what the committee has aimed
to do. It has framed a plan that (a) establishes a unified court,
(b) provides for adequate administrative supervision, (c) gives
the courts full rule-making power, and (d) substitutes an im-
proved plan for the selection of judges."
The proposed judiciary article of 1942 created a General Court
of Minnesota with divisions consisting of the supreme court, the
district court and a county court for each county. Within the frame-
work of this court all justice in the state was to be administered.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Minn. Laws 1955, c. 881.
MIN'..ESOT. I 1... 111" Rl:. "IF.II"
There was no provision for the creation of inferior courts such as
justices of the peace, probate courts and nunicipal courts.
To permit effective administration, an administrative council
was created, consisting of representatives of each of the divisions.
This council was given very broad powers. It could alter the juris-
diction of divisions, provide for appellate divisions of district courts.
create subdivisions of district and county courts, provide for assign-
ment of judges, change the number and boundaries of judicial dis-
tricts, etc.
The proposed article conferred rule making power upon the
supreme court for all divisions. It required that clerks of court be
appointed by the court. It provided for the selection of judges
through what is known as the Missouri plan, whereby the governor
initially appoints from a list submitted by a nominating commission.
These proposals embodied the views and recommendations of
most students of judicial administration. The committee's plan was
hailed as "a thoroughly-modernized court system" which "combines
the best of the profession's thinking and experience on virtually all
phases of the structure and work of the courts .... Whether or not
it is ever adopted by the people, the mere formulation of the plan
is an outstanding contribution to the science of judicial administra-
tion."' In the state it received a cold if not hostile reception, and no
action, legislative or otherwise, was taken on it.
In 1947, the legislature created a Constitutional Commission.
made up largely of members of the legislature, to consider and re-
port on needed changes in the constitution of the state. The Con-
mission submitted its report in 1948. A preliminary report which
had been prepared by its judiciary committee was given circulation
and comments were invited." The preliminary report was a more
conservative document than the proposal of the Loring Committee
but still, it contained many of the latter's features. The spirit of the
report is reflected in the following introductory words:
"The proposed revision presents no arbitrary or revolution-
ary changes. Your Committee has endeavored to provide an
evolutionary plan of sufficient elasticity to allow, in the light of
practical experience, for gradual changes through legislative
action.
'1
4
Article VI, as it appeared in tie final report of the Commission.
eliminated many of the more liberal features of the preliminary draft
2. 26 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 133 (1943).
3. See Preliminary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of the
Minnesota State Constitution, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 458 (1948).
4. Ibid.
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and reduced to a corresponding degree the changes it would effect
in the existing judiciary article.
The draft of the constitution as prepared by the Commission
failed to receive legislative approval and hence was never submitted
to the voters. Its limited acceptance was probably due more to
opposition to other provisions of the proposed constitution than to
the judiciary article itself.
Thereafter, a committee of the Minnesota State Bar Associa-
tion took up the subject, adopting essentially the draft of the 1947
Commission with some changes which are discussed below. It is the
proposal of this committee, approved by the State Bar Association,
which was adopted by the legislature at the 1955 session for sub-
mission to the electorate at the coming election.
The usual judiciary article of a state constitution deals with the
court structure, jurisdiction of its various parts, the selection and
tenure of its personnel, and the powers of the legislature and of the
courts with respect to various judicial and court problems and details.
In drafting such an article, fundamental questions of policy arise.
What shall be incorporated in the constitution and thus placed be-
yond the power of change by courts or legislature? Whichl powers
shall be allocated to the legislature and which shall be left to the
courts? How general or detailed shall specific provisions be ? These
are questions quite aside from the policy questions on the subject
matter itself such as election of judges as opposed to appointment.
It is possible and feasible to leave most questions to legislative
decision in which event the provisions of the judicial article can be
very brief and general. The United States Constitution Article I II.
consisting of but three short sections, is an example. States, how-
ever, have not followed this example and have tended to go into
extensive detail, prescribing the various courts, their jurisdiction,
districts, etc. The more modem tendency, exemplified by the 1945
New Jersey Constitution, is toward more general provisions, leaving
to the legislature and courts the necessary detail. Details in the
constitution not dealing with fundamental principles and problems,
make for an inflexible structure and invite litigation over the appli-
cation of the provisions.
The proposed judiciary article has moved in the direction of the
modem trend. There has been a simplification and clarification of
the article. But, as will be noted, in some respects it fails to incor-
porate the best thought on modern court organization.
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SUPREME COURT'
The present constitution provides for the chief justice and six
associate justices. The new proposal would authorize not less than
six nor more than eight associate justices. Permitting some flexi-
bility to the legislature on this score is perhaps desirable. The change
is not dictated by any present need. The number of cases appealed
has declined drastically over the last twenty-five years, from approx-
imately 500 cases in which opinions were rendered to about 200 at
the present time. At the same time there has been an increase in
the research assistance made available to the court. I-owever, many
of the present cases may be more complex than past cases and there
are of course more prior judicial decisions to canvass. Opinions have
also become longer, although sometimes unnecessarily. Thus, while
presently not needed, possible future needs warrant the proposed
change.
If future needs are taken into account, it would seem that some
provision should have been incorporated authorizing the creation of
divisions within the court either by the legislature or by the court
itself. This is not uncommon in other states and in appropriate cases
serves every need and saves manpower for the more difficult and
complex problems requiring consideration by the whole court. It
might also have been desirable to authorize appellate divisions of
the district court which could profitably deal with review of fact
questions decided in district court cases such as the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a verdict. Such cases serve very little pur-
pose as precedents and could properly be left to appellate divisions
with discretionary review in the supreme court. Without constitu-
tional authorization it is probable that neither of these devices can
be authorized."
The obsolete provision that one or more terms shall be held at
the seat of government and by two thirds authorization of the legis-
lature in any judicial district has been wisely eliminated. It reflects
merely the pioneer conditions of the early days of the state. Although
harmless, today it serves no purpose.
Additional help for the court may be temporarily obtained un-
der the proposed provision permitting district court judges to be
5. The verbal change from "The supreme court," to "a supreme court" in
§ 1, vesting power in the courts, is insignificant.
6. The provision of Minn. Const. art. V1, § 5, that the district court
"shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law," which
appears also in the proposed amendment is probably insufficient to authorize
appellate review of decisions made within the district court itself but refers
to appeals from inferior courts and administrative and other bodies perform-
ing functions of a judicial nature.
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assigned temporarily to the supreme court. This replaces the present
provision in Article VI, section 3, to the effect that if all or a
majority of the supreme court judges are disqualified in a case, the
governor shall assign judges of the district court. This has been
rarely resorted to. The new provision is a far more useful and prac-
tical one.- Not only would this help relieve the court in periods of
excessive case loads, but it would permit the testing of members of
the trial bench for possible selection to the supreme court for later
vacancies. It would also give to the supreme court the benefit of the
experience of trial judges and therefore a better appreciation of
the problems that face them in the trial of cases.
The supreme court now appoints its reporter. Under the pro-
posal, it will also appoint its clerk, now selected by election. This
is a desirable and needed change. The duties of that office are largely
routine, clerical and without policy implications. Its main purpose is
to serve the court and litigants with cases before that court. Voters
do not and cannot be expected to know the functions of the office
and the qualifications which the position requires. The inability of
the court to select and control its own clerical force, on which it is in
considerable part dependent for its efficient and effective operation.
has led at times in the past to unpublicized embarrassments.
These observations apply also to the state law librarian now
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate
under Article V, section 4. Some difficulties of draftsmanship are
presented however. The new proposal transfers the appointment to
the supreme court. The proposal is only an amendment of Article
VI. Section 2 of the proposed article provides for the appointment
by the supreme court of "a state law librarian." Article V, section
4, which is not to be amended, contains the present provision for
appointment by the governor of "a state librarian." Unless we are
to have two librarians, it will be necessary to construe "a state law
librarian" in the amendment as referring to the same office as "a
state librarian" in Article V, section 4, and while the amendment
does not purport to amend Article V, by necessary implication it
does so. The point should have been dealt with more directly.
The supreme court is also to appoint "such other employees as
it may deem necessary." This sweeping authority undoubtedly
would not be abused and would still be subject to legislative control
through the appropriations required to pay the salaries of the em-
ployees appointed.
7. It is to be regretted that the proposal does not relieve the chiefjustice of the burden of his duties as a member of the pardon board. See Minn.
Const. art V, § 4.
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The proposed article does not expressly confer rule-nmaking
power upon the supreme court. The present article provides that
"legal pleadings and proceedings in the courts of this State shall
be under the direction of the legislature."8 This is not retained in
the proposed article. It is probable that under this provision of the
present article legislation is authorized which confers power upon
courts to make rules of pleading, procedure and evidence. On that
assumption, the supreme court has been given power to make rules
of procedure in civil actionsf The question, however, is not beyond
doubt, and the doubt may be increased by the omission of the quoted
provision. A provision such as appeared in the draft of the 1947
Constitutional Commission would have been desirableY'
DISTRICT COURTS
The jurisdiction of the district courts will not be changed by
the proposed amendment, the changes made in this respect being
primarily verbal ones.'
Article VI, section 4, of the present Minnesota Constitution
requires that the legislature divide the state into judicial districts
"which shall be composed of contiguous territory, be bounded by
county lines, and contain a population as nearly equal as may be
practicable." One or more judges, as prescribed by the legislature,
are elected in each district.
There are now nineteen judicial districts. With minor excep-
tions they have not been changed since 1907. They differ widely in
population. According to the 1950 census, the sixth judicial district
has a population of approximately 55,000 and the seventh approxi-
mately 300,000. A recent special report of the Minnesota Judicial
Council indicated wide differences in the case load per judge in the
various districts.
The proposed judiciary article will permit greater freedom to
make changes in the size and boundaries of judicial districts. Article
VI, section 3, of the proposal provides that "The number and hound-
8. Minn. Const. art. VI § 14.
9. Minn. Stat. §§ 480.091-.058 (1953).
10. Section 5 of the draft provided: "Rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence for all courts shall be made as provided by law."
11. Some awkward language in the present constitution seems to exclude
the jurisdiction of the district court in civil cases involving less than $100 and
in criminal cases involving punishment which exceeds three months' imprison-
ment or a fine of $100. Minn. Const. art. VI, § 5. This language, however,
which the proposed amendment removes, has been construed not to exclude thejurisdiction of the district court in such cases. State v. Bach, 36 Minn. 234,
30 N. W. 764 (1886) ; Agin v. Heyward, 6 Minn. 53 (1861).
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aries of judicial districts shall be established or changed in the
manner provided by law but the office of a district judge may not
be abolished during his term." Under this provision, the legislature
may itself fix the number of districts and their boundaries or, and
this would be preferable, may transfer the responsibility for so doing
to the district court or to the supreme court or to an administrative
council of the courts or to some other appropriate body. This is
essentially a matter of administrative organization and should prop-
erly be left to the judiciary.
There is a questionable provision in the new article that "there
shall be two or more district judges in each district." At the present
time, the seven districts which have but a single judge are in no need
of additional judges.'- The thought seems to be that, by requiring a
minimum of two judges in any district, the legislature will be forced
to enlarge the size of the single judge districts so that there will be
sufficient judicial business for both judges.13 The underlying feeling
is probably that the presence of two or more judges in a district
makes for a more tolerant judiciary and permits some degree of
choosing by the litigants, either by resort to affidavits of prejudice
or otherwise. Whether this is a matter of such importance that it
should be embodied in a constitutional requirement is open to seri-
ous question. The optimum size of judicial districts depends on a
number of factors and will differ from one period to the next. Who-
ever is given the responsibility for determining the question should
not be hampered by a constitutional provision of the nature pro-
posed. The proposal also runs the risk that the pressures against
increasing the size of a judicial district will be so great in some
instances that legislation will be enacted adding an unneeded judge
rather than changing the size of the district.
Administrative organization of the district court is now prac-
tically non-existent. There is the District Judges Association which
meets annually, heirs addresses, considers rules for the district
court, which it has power to promulgate within a limited area,'
studies problems confronting the district courts and passes resolu-
tions. But it has little administrative power. It cannot assign judges
to overburdened districts or require reports of clerks of court or
from judges as to the work being done and the conditions of trial
12. See letter of Chief Justice Roger L. Dell to the district judges of the
state reproduced in 24 Hennepin Lawyer 51 (1956).
13. See Howard, Proposed Amendimet to Article VI of the Constitiu-
tion, 13 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 4, p. 13 (1956).
14. Minn. Stat § 484.33 (1953).
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calendars. It is not responsible for and has no control over setting of
trial terms or any other aspect of the distribution of judicial b~usiness
of the district courts. State and local budgets for district courts are
not its concern. Nor is there any other agency within the judicial
system in which these powers and responsibilities reside. lIiecc
legislative tinkering when some aggravated local condition arises
has been the rule. At every session, legislation is passed changing
the general terms of this or that judicial district, a function essen-
tially for the courts and quite inappropriate for a busy legislature
overburdened with major matters of statewide import.
When "the convenience or interest of the public or the interest
of any litigant shall require,"'" a judge of one district may request
a judge of another district to assist him. But until recently' in-
formation has not been systematically kept in any central place to
indicate who was free to assist and, if free, willing to do so.' 7 Nor.
until recently, has there been evidence of any widespread sense of
obligation on the part of unoccupied judges to go to the aid of those
overburdened. This is probably an inevitable product of the fact that
district court judges, while paid primarily by the state, are elected
by the voters of their district. This tends to promote the feeling
that their obligation is essentially to dispose of the litigation of their
districts and no more.' 8
The situation as it has existed in this and many other states is
15. Minn. Stat. § 484.05 (1953).
16. See Minn. Laws 1955, c. 483, § 4; Minn. Laws 1955. c. 767, § 1, di;
cussed infra.
17. A limited and inadequate system of statistics has been kept by the
Minnesota Judicial Council. See the various reports of the Council.
18. Unfortunately, the proposed new judiciary article may emphasize
this tendency. The district court judge must be a resident of his district at
the time of his selection and during his continuance in office. Minn. Laws
1955, c. 881, § 3. He must be elected by the electors of the district wherein lie
is to serve. Id. § 8. These requirements exist also in substance under the
present constitution. "Every district judge shall, at the time of his election,.
be a resident of the district for which he shall be elected, and shall reside
therein during his continuance in office." Minn. Const. art. VI, § 4. But it
further provides, "The legislature may provide by law that the judge of one
district may discharge the duties of the judge of any other district not hi,
own, when convenience or the public interest may require it." Minn. Const.
art. VI, § 5. This does not appear in the proposed article nor is there anN
similar provision. There is no indication anywhere in the article that district
court judges may be permitted to function in any district other than that
in which they were elected. To enable them to do so, it will be necessary
to contend that the article provides for but one district court, that judges are
members of the entire court and therefore empowered to exercise its jur'-
diction anywhere in the state.
The deficiencies of the proposed article in this respect are a product of
the failure to give any recognition to the need for some mean, of effective
court administration.
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well described in a statement made forty years ago by the eminent
lawyer-statesman, Elil Root :19
"I do not wish to say anything against any justice of the
supreme court,20 but they are the only body of public officers
that I know of anywhere who have the absolute power to deter-
mine what they shall do, when and where they shall do it, and
whether they shall do it or not; I do not believe that a judicial
system is perfect unless it provides for some way in which duties
may be prescribed, which it shall be incumbent upon a justice of
the supreme court to perform."
In the last twenty-five years there has been a rapid movement
in the direction of creating an administrative organization of the
courts for the more effective management of judicial business, par-
ticularly in the trial courts. The outstanding example is the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts, established in 1939.21
The director of this office is given wide administrative powers in-
cluding supervision of federal court employees, the gathering and
analysis of statistical data concerning the work of the various federal
courts, the preparation of the budgets of the lower federal courts
and the expenditure of the funds appropriated for these courts. All
of the activities of the office are under the direction of the Judicial
Conference of the United States consisting of the chief judges of
the judicial circuits and the Chief Justice of the United States as
chairman.2 2 A glance at any of the annual reports of the office will
demonstrate the invaluable service this office is rendering to the
federal judicial system.23
The success of the federal program has led to similar action in
a number of states. Thus, the Constitution of New Jersey, adopted
in 1947, provides :24
"1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be admin-
istrative head of all the courts of the State. He shall appoint an
Administrative Director to service at his pleasure.
"2. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall assign
Judges of the Superior Court25 to the Divisions and Parts of the
Superior Court, and may from time to time transfer judges from
19. Quoted in Report of the New York Committee on Administration of
Justice, at 459 (1934).
20. The Supreme Court of New York is the trial court of generaljurisdiction of that state.
21. 28 U. S. C. § 601 (1952).
22. 28 U. S. C. §331 (1952).
23. See Pirsig, A Survey of Judicial Councils, Judicial Confcrences and
Admninistrative Directors, 47 Brief 181 (1952).
24. N. J. Const. art. VI, § 7. Art VI, § 2, para. 3, also provides, "The
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in
the State...."
25. This is the trial court of general jurisdiction of New Jersey.
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one assignment to another, as need appears. Assignments to the
Appellate Division shall be for terms fixed by rules of the
Supreme Court."
The great strides made in increasing efficiency and reducing
delays as the result of the active exercise of these powers may be
seen in the reports since made by Chief Justice Vanderbilt and his
administrative director..
2 1
For many years Michigan provided for the assignment of judges
from one district to another by the presiding judge of their trial
court. In 1952, this program was expanded by the creation of an
administrative director, following substantially the uniform act on
the subject and conferring broad and comprehensive administrative
powers.2 7 In 1953, an Oregon act"' conferred administrative author-
ity over the trial courts of general jurisdiction upon the supreme
court to be exercised by the chief justice who "shall appoint an
assistant." In 1955, a judicial conference was created in New York
consisting of representatives of the appellate and trial divisions
of the supreme court with the chief judge of the court of appeals
as chairman.2 9 The function of this body appears to be primarily to
study and make recommendations concerning improvements in the
administration of justice, but some administrative functions are
contemplated. 0 These are but recent examples of the steady prog-
ress that has been made in this area.
Stirred by this movement, the Loring Committee in its judiciary
article provided for a strong administrative council. The 1947 Coin-
mission in its draft also created such a council but with less exten-
sive powers. It was to be made up of representatives of the various
courts plus a lawyer and a layman and its powers were defined as
follows:
"Subject to law it shall formulate policies for the efficient ad-
ministration of the court system of the state and cause such
policies to be executed by its chairman."1 No action shall be
taken hereunder which interferes with the exercise of the judicial
functions of a judge in any case or proceeding, and whether there
is such interference shall be a judicial question."
26. See Vanderbilt, The First Five Years of the New Jersey Corts
Under the Constitution of 1947, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 289 (1954). Vaiderbilt.
The Record of the New Jersey Courts in the Sixth Year Under the Constill-
lion of 1947. 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 489 (1955). Prior annual report, of Chief
Justice Vanderbilt appear in earlier volumes of The Rutger Law Review.
27. Mich. Pub. Acts 1952, Act. No. 269.
28. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 2.310-.340 (1953).
29. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 869.
30. Departmental committees for each of the departments of the supreme
courts are also provided for. The complex court organization of the state of
New York presents problems not to be found in Minnesota.
31. The chief justice.
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The last sentence reflects the fears of trial judges and possibly
others over the creation of such a body and the arguments used
against it. As already indicated, nothing came of the recommenda-
tions of th6 1947 Commission.
In the meantime, there have been signs of legislative dissatisfac-
tion with the present state of affairs. In 1953, a house resolution
requested the Minnesota Judicial Council, the District Judges Asso-
ciation and the Minnesota State Bar Association to study and report
on the workload, redistricting, number and allocation of district
court judges, and other related matters. Following a careful study,
a valuable report on the conditions in the district courts was made.
As a result the number of judges in some of the districts was in-
creased. The report of the three organizations also recommended
that some of the districts be combined into a single one, but no action
has been taken on this recommendation. The report also urged, in
view of the difficulty that had been experienced in securing adequate
information about the work of the district courts, that legislation be
enacted requiring clerks of district courts to keep a minimum of
specified information and requiring this information to be reported
to the judicial council. In response, an act was passed requiring the
clerks to keep a record of all actions and proceedings and "furnish
to the state Supreme Court any information concerning said actions
as shall be prescribed by rule of civil procedure."3 2 Thus far such
a rule has not been prescribed nor has the advisory committee to
the supreme court on civil procedure as yet recommended such a
rule.
The same concern for the effective utilization of the judicial
force of the state also led to the enactment in 1953 of the following
provision, appended to the act adding a judge to the eighth judicial
district :
"The additional judge provided for by this act may, when the
public convenience and necessity require it, be assigned by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to serve and discharge the
duties of judge of any other district not his own at such time as
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may determine."
A similar provision was added in creating an additional judge-
ship in the nineteenth district.34
For reasons not known, the former provision was repealed in
1955. 35 But in the same legislative session, in adding some judges to
32. Minn. Stat § 485.16 (1955).
33. Mum. Laws 1953, c. 584, § 3.
34. Minn. Laws 1953, c. 687, § 2.
35. Minn. Laws 1955, c. 147.
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the fourth and tenth judicial districts, the following general provi-
sion was added:
"When public convenience and necessity require it, the chief
justice of the supreme court may assign any judge of the district
court to serve and discharge the duties of judge of any other
district not his own at such times as the chief justice may deter-
mine."3 6
Chief Justice Roger L. Dell moved vigorously to the discharge of his
responsibilities under this act.37
As a result, with the assistance of judges assigned from other
districts, the calendar arrears in the fourth and second judicial dis-
tricts have been attacked with a vigor and utilization of the judicial
resources of the state not previously evidenced in the nemory of the
writer .3
There has thus been, both nationally and within this state, a
movement toward the creation of an administrative organization of
the courts. A constitutional provision creating such an organization,
as does the New Jersey Constitution, or authorizing or directing the
legislature to so provide would appear to be most desirable. The
draft of the Judiciary Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Asso-
ciation prepared for submission to the 1953 annual meeting of the
Association contained such a provision, following almost verbatim
the wording of the draft of the 1947 Commission. " But this met
with vigorous opposition from the District Judges Association and
at its request, the provision was deleted. It is probably too nmtch to
36. Minn. Laws 1955, c. 483, § 4.
37. See letter of Chief Justice Dell to the district judges of the state,
reproduced in 24 Hennepin Lawyer 51 (1946), in which, after reviewing the
condition of calendars in the various districts, he stated:
"On the first day of the session of the next Legislature I will file with
both the Senate and House a written report of the status of the calendars of
the District Courts throughout the State and of what progress has been made
in clearing up calendars since the adjournment of the 1955 session of the
Legislature. I request the senior or sole judge of each of the districts to
write me as to the status of the calendars in their districts on the first (lay of
June and again on the 15th day of December 1956. If in the meantime a situa-
tion develops in your district which requires assistance from an outside judge
if you will write to me I will endeavor to obtain assistance for you. I see
no reason why I should not be able to report to the next Legislature that all
district courts throughout the State are being maintained on a current basis
except perhaps in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties and if those counties are
not then current they should be nearly so."
38. The writer is familiar in some detail only with the conditions ill the
fourth judicial district. In recent years the inability to keep current in the trial
of cases has not been attributable to lack of concern or effort on the part of
the judges of that district. The cases to be tried were too great in number to
be disposed of by the judicial force available.
39. See Final Report of Special Committee on Revision of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Minnesota, 10 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 6. 88 (1953).
The draft provided that the legislature "may" establihh such a council. T(
draft of the 1947 Commission used the Nsord ",hall."
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expect the lawyers of a state to override the determined opposition
of the judges before whom they must practice. It is regretable that
the judges should have found it necessary to object to a measure
designed to expedite their work and found useful and effective in
other states.
As a result of this development, the proposed judiciary article
likewise contains no provision on the subject. This undoubtedly will
not prevent legislation on the subject but the history of previous
efforts in the state indicates that without some stimulant in the con-
stitution progress is likely to be slow and consist of piecemeal and
inadequate measures passed to remedy some immediate and usually
local situation.
The creation of an effective administration of the courts will
also be made more difficult by the retention, in the proposed amend-
ment, of the election of clerks of the district court. The primary
functions of a district court clerk include the receipt and filing of
pleadings and other documents incident to litigation, managing the
trial calendar, administering oaths, entering judgments, maintaining
the judgment docket, making and certifying copies of documents on
file and other duties of a similar nature. These consist of administra-
tive details essential to the administration of justice which someone
other than the judge must perform. How they are performed affects
vitally the work of the court and the efficiency with which litigation
is disposed. Practically no question of general policy upon which
the voter should pass is involved. It is a position peculiarly appro-
priate for appointment by the court. This was recognized in the
Loring Committee plan and in the preliminary draft of the 1947
Commission.4 0 But the final draft of the 1947 Commission omitted
this provision and returned to the present system of election.
As has already been noted, the proposed article before the elec-
torate this fall provides for appointment of the clerk of the supreme
court. The considerations leading to this position apply with equal
force to the district court clerk. As a minimum, the question should
have been left to the legislature instead of freezing the elective
method of selection in the constitution.4 ' As it is, the district court
will be the only court in the state constitutionally prohibited from
40. See Preliminary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of the
Minnesota State Constitution, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 458 (1948).
41. There is also a provision in the proposal that the compensation of a
clerk of district court "shall not be diminished during his term of office," a
provision usually reserved for judges in order to strengthen the position of
independence essential to the judicial function. This seems designed still
further to strengthen the independent position of the clerk and confers a con-
stitutional advantage not given to the clerk of the supreme court or the clerk
of any other court.
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appointing its own clerk, a fact hardly in keeping with its status in
other respects.
LOCAL COURTS
The present constitution provides on the local level for justices
of the peace, probate courts and such other courts, inferior to the
supreme court, as the legislature may establish by a two thirds vote.
The courts established "inferior to the supreme court" have been
almost wholly the municipal courts of the state.
Outside of the large urban centers, the justices of the peace and
the municipal court and probate court judges function largely on a
part time basis and are compensated on a fee basis.'2 Justices of the
peace and municipal court judges need not be and most of them
have not been members of the bar. Until the adoption of the 1954
amendment to the constitution and subsequent legislation limiting
future candidates for the position to lawyers, this was true also of
probate court judges.
Thus, in the rural counties, there are likely to be found three
part time courts, the probate court, a municipal court and one or
more justices of the peace. For all of the judges of these courts,
except for those justices of the peace and municipal courts which
prey upon sportsmen and the traveling public, their judicial work
is likely to be a sideline activity.
The proposed new Article VI eliminates the justice of the peace
as a constitutional officer. Surely, this is a step in the right direction.
There should not be in the judicial system of a state, a constitu-
tionally protected office as antiquated as the justice of the peace
whose name has become almost synonymous with miscarriages of
justice and in too many instances with outright corruption. The
notion of a layman, ignorant of the law, deciding the legal rights of
parties in civil litigation and of defendants in criminal cases is wholly
irreconcilable with the fundamental tenet of our government that
justice shall be administered in accordance with established princi-
ples of law and not at the whim, or caprice or personal notions of
justice held by some individual exercising the power of the state.
The fact that the amount in litigation is small or that the crimes
charged are minor ones does not in a democratic society alter the
application of this fundamental philosophy.
Whether the removal of the justice of the peace as a constitu-
tional officer will stimulate action toward much needed reform may
42. However, municipal court judges are increasingly being placed on a
salary.
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be open to question. As has been observed: the present constitution
does not require that the legislature confer any particular jurisdic-
tion on justices of the peace. It could be conferred upon some other
more competent court, but this has not taken place. Similarly, many
municipal courts which now are under full legislative control may
be occupied under present laws by laymen with qualifications and
performance no higher than those of justices of the peace. But in any
event the elimination of the justice of the peace from the constitution
is desirable.
With several independent courts all operating on a part time
basis in a county, it would seem to make good sense to combine
all of these activities and, if necessary, enlarge their scope and tie
geographical area covered and establish a full time court manned by
a competent judge paid an adequate salary. The Loring Committee
plan proceeded on this premise and created a county court as a divi-
sion of a comprehensive state court. Its jurisdiction was defined as
follows :4
"Subject to the power of the administrative council,45 it shall
have jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount in controversy
does not exceed one thousand dollars; of cases of unlawful de-
tainer; of the estates of deceased persons and of the persons and
estates of insane persons and persons under guardianship except
in counties embracing a city of the first class, and concurrently
with the district court, of all criminal cases where the punish-
ment for the offense involved does not exceed ninety days in
jail or a fine of one hundred dollars."
This provision, along with most others of the plan, received
little serious or friendly public or professional consideration and this
approach was not pursued by the Constitutional Commission of
1947. A preliminary draft of recommendations prepared by the
judiciary committee of the 1947 Commission authorized the creation
of local magistracies with minor civil and criminal jurisdiction and
empowered the legislature to provide in lieu thereof for a county
court. This recommendation, however, did not survive the final draft
and in any event the proposed county court would not have encom-
passed the work of the probate court. The probate court was pre-
served as a constitutional court with defined jurisdiction but with
some changes from the then existing constitutional provisions to
43. Howard, Proposed Amendment to Article VI of the Constitution,
14 Bench & Bar of Minn., No. 4, p. 13 (1956).
44. Committee on Unification of the Courts, Recommended Constitutional
Amendment, § 4.
45. "The council shall have power, by rules approved by the supreme
court, to alter the jurisdiction herein conferred upon the district and county
courts...." Id. § 9.
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clarify the jurisdiction of the court. It also eliminated the counlt
as the basis of geographical organization of the probate court and
permitted the organization of probate court districts on some other
basis. The justice of the peace was eliminated as a constitutional
court.
Following the failure of the legislature to take favorable action
on the recommendations of the 1947 Commission. two lines of action
emerged on the part of those interested in the improvement of the
organization of local courts. One of these appears to have originated
with the probate judges of the state and led to legislation' subinit-
ting an amendment of Article VI, section 7. dealing with probate
courts. The amendment was adopted at the 1954 election and is iii
force today. It reads as follows :"
"There shall be established in each organized county in the State
a probate court, which shall be a court of record, and be held at
such time and place as may be prescribed by law. It shall be held
by one judge, whose qualifications may be established by law.
The judge shall be elected by the voters of the county for a term
of four years. He shall be a resident of such county at the time
of his election, and reside therein during his continuance in office.
His compensation shall be provided by law. He may appoint his
own clerk or register of probate for such county, whose powers.
duties, term of office and compensation shall be prescribed by
law. A probate court shall have jurisdiction over the person
and estate, either or both, of persons under guardianship; over
estates of deceased persons; and such further jurisdiction as the
legislature may from time to time establish by a two-thirds vote."
Four changes resulted from this amendment:
(1) The legislature may now fix the qualifications of the pro-
hate judge. This, probably more than any other change. received
public notice prior to the election at which the amendment was sub-
mitted. Legislation was immediately enacted in the 1955 session
requiring probate judges, present occupants of the office excepted.
to be members of the bar.18
46. Minn. Laws 1953, c. 759.
47. Previous to the amendment, section 7 read as follows:
"There shall be established in each organized county in the State a pro-
bate court, which shall be a court of record, and be held at such time and
place as may be prescribed by law. It shall be held by one judge, who shall be
elected by the voters of the county for the term of four years. He shall be a
resident of such county at the time of his election, and reside therein during
his continuance in office; and his compensation shall be provided by law. H e,
may appoint his own clerk where none has been elected; but the legislatur.
may authorize the election, by the electors of any county, of one clerk or
register of probate for such county, whose powers, duties, term of office and
compensation shall be prescribed by law. A probate court shall have juri-
diction over the estates of deceased persons and persons under guardianlhip.
but no other jurisdiction, except as prescribed by this Constitution."
48. Minn. Laws 1955. c. 197. The phrase "learned in the law" ik u,,l
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(2) The power of the legislature to provide for election of clerks
or registers of the court was removed. So far as knovn, this
power had not been exercised. These officials have uniformly been
appointed by the probate judge.
(3) The language of the last sentence of the above quoted
amendment more clearly spells out that the jurisdiction of the court
extends to the person as well as to the estate of persons under guard-
ianship.49
(4) The legislature, by a two-thirds vote, may confer further
jurisdiction upon the probate court. The scope of the jurisdiction
that may be conferred appears to be without limitation of any kind.
This was very probably included with the thought that thereby.
the probate court could serve as a nucleus for development as a
county court, with jurisdiction extending to civil, criminal, and
other matters which two thirds of the legislature might think desir-
able. With the improved qualifications now fixed for judges of this
court, such expansion becomes feasible.
The second line of development has been supplied by the Minne-
sota State Bar Association. While endorsing the 1954 amendment
of section 7, it was proceeding through its own committee to study
the recommendations of the 1947 Commission, including, of course,
section 7. The committee report was submitted to the annual meet-
ing of the Association in 1953. In the proposed draft of Article VI,
not only was the justice of the peace removed as a constitutional
officer, but the probate court was removed as well, thus leaving the
legislature complete freedom in dealing with the local court prob-
lem. The legislature was permitted to establish "other courts . . .
with jurisdiction inferior to the district court, including courts with
probate and such other jurisdiction as may be provided by law."
To do so, a two-thirds vote of the legislature was not required. 0
But the probate court was not to succumb to such easy death. By
convention time, or as a product of the convention,"1 it was restored
49. This seemed definitely settled by judicial decision even prior to the
amendment See Jasperson v. Jacobson, 224 Minn. 76, 27 N. W. 2d 788(1947). In that case it w%-as held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate
court extended only to those guardianships which were known at the time the
constitution was adopted and, hence, the guardianship of a child committed
to an agency could be given by the district court acting as a juvenile court
The case arose in Hennepin County where the district court acts as thejuvenile court. The adoption of the 1954 amendment raises this question:
Does the amendment speak of guardianships as of the date of its adoption
and hence encompass the kind of guardianship involved in the Jasperson case?
50. See Report of Special Committee on Revision of the Constitution
of the State of Minnesota, 10 Bench & Bar of Min., No. 6, p. 88 (1953).
51. The record is not clear. See Final Report of Special Committee on
Revision of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota, 10 Bench & Bar of
Minn., No. 10, p. 52 (1953).
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as a constitutional court and its jurisdiction delineated. In this form
it was approved by the Association, and in the same form it was
adopted by the legislature. It is to be voted upon at the coming 1956
election. It appears as section 6 in the proposed article. The general
pattern was taken from the draft of the 1947 Commission with one
major change to be noted. It now reads as follows:
"The Probate Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction
in law and equity for the administration of the estates of de-
ceased persons and all guardianship and incompetency proceed-
ings, and such further jurisdiction as the legislature may estab-
lish, including jurisdiction over the administration of trust estates
and for the determination of taxes contingent upon death. Until
otherwise provided by law, each county shall constitute a probate
court district and there shall be one or more probate judges in
each district. Each judge of the probate court in any district shall
be a resident of such district at the time of his selection and dur-
ing his continuance in office."152
Thus, two years after having approved an amendment to section
7 of Article VI, the voters are asked to reconsider and to approve
a new version as part of the general revision of the article as a whole.
They will be asked to approve the following changes from the
amendment adopted in 1954:
(1) The legislature is given full authority to organize the pro-
bate courts into larger units and will not be required to establish
probate courts in each county. The proposed amendment will also
permit legislation to provide for more than one judge in a given
district. This is particularly important to counties with large urban
populations such as Hennepin which are now confined by constitu-
tional provision to a single probate judge. In other parts of the
state, a single county does not have enough probate work to war-
rant a full time judge. Under the proposed amendment, several
counties could be combined into a single probate court district with
a single full time judge. This is therefore a very desirable liberal-
ization.
(2) The legislature, on a simple majority vote, may extend the
52. There is also a change in section 1 of Article VI. The present sec-
tion provides for "courts of probate." The change substitutes "a probate
court." Heretofore, district courts of the state have been treated as one court
for the entire state. Smith v. Barr, 76 Minn. 513, 79 N. W. 507 (1899). The
intention in the changed wording is to provide similarly for a single probate
court rather than a separate court for each county. The bringing of a probate
proceeding in a proper county becomes then merely a question of venue and
not of jurisdiction. See In re Estate of Martin, 188 Minn. 408, 247 N. W. 515(1933). However, this has been held to be only a question of venue under
the present constitution. In re Estate of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147, 210 N. W.
40 (1926). The proposed change in language is but a recognition of existing
law on the subject.
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jurisdiction of the probate court to any area of judicial business
whether civil or criminal litigation, divorce, unlawful detainer, regis-
tration of titles to real estate, or any other cases which the legisla-
ture may choose. A two-thirds vote is not required. The suggestion
for this provision probably came from the 1954 amendment which,
however, required a two-thirds vote of the legislature.53 There was
no similar provision in the draft of the 1947 Commission. It repre-
sents a radical departure from previous conceptions,5 as to the
function of the constitutional provision dealing with this subject.
Heretofore, until the 1954 amendment, the constitution defined the
entire jurisdiction of the probate court. With some minor qualifica-
tions such as the juvenile court jurisdiction which has been given by
legislation to the probate courts in the rural district and to the dis-
trict courts in the urban areas, this jurisdiction was exclusive. As
judicially defined, nothing could be added to this jurisdiction and
nothing could be taken away. Under the proposed amendment, all
restrictions on the jurisdiction that may be added have been re-
moved. The only function of the specific provisions of the section
now will be to prohibit the legislature from depriving the probate
court of the jurisdiction designated. The 1954 amendment took a
long step in this direction but limited it by the requirement of a
two-thirds vote.
(3) The jurisdiction which the legislature may confer on the
probate court appears to be unlimited. It need not be "inferior to
the district court" under section 1 of the proposed article since that
qualification is limited to "other courts, minor judicial officers and
commissioners" than the supreme court, district court and probate
court.
Is this desirable? The writer believes that it is and that the real
question is whether the draft should not have gone farther and also
have removed the prohibition against removing the jurisdiction
specifically defined. This will be developed in a moment.
(4) The jurisdiction of the probate court specifically designated
and which cannot be taken away by legislation is redefined as "un-
limited original jurisdiction in law and equity for the administration
of the estates of deceased persons and all guardianship and incom-
petency proceedings." The phrase "jurisdiction in law and equity
for the administration of the estates of deceased persons" will be
very difficult to apply. The words "in law and equity" normally
53. The amendment is set out supra at note 47.
54. Except for the abortive first report of the State Bar Association
Committee.
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mean the jurisdiction of the courts of law and the courts of
equity under the common law system of England. This immediately
introduces an area of uncertainty. The administration of estates of
deceased persons was principally in the ecclesiastical courts and the
chancery court. The probating of wills and the granting of letters
of administration were exclusively functions of the former. There
was practically no administration in the true sense of the word in
the courts of law, the rights and duties of representatives being en-
forced through ordinary litigation." In the United States, from
the earliest times, the probate court, under various names has gen-
erally existed as a separate and distinct court from that upon which
general jurisdiction in law and equity has been conferred. One of
the major problems in this and other states has been to define,
through the processes of litigation in appellate courts, the scope of
jurisdiction intended for these courts recognizing that formerly in
England the intended jurisdiction resided principally in the ecclesias-
tical and equity courts. To refer, therefore, to "law and equity,"
language not previously used, as a source of jurisdiction for the
administration of estates of deceased persons can introduce nothing
but confusion on the subject. 6 The present language. embodied in
the 1954 amendment, has the merit of retaining previous language
which judicial decisions have in considerable measure construed.
Standing also as a challenge to interpretation is the curious addi-
tion of the word "unlimited" to the "original jurisdiction" of the
probate court. Unlimited by what? It may have had some place in
the draft of the 1947 Constitutional Commission. In this draft, the
jurisdiction of the probate court was to be that specified in the con-
stitution-no more or less. The word "unlimited" might then be
said to be an admonition to the courts that this provision was to be
construed broadly in favor of jurisdiction. Under the amendment
now proposed, as we have seen, the function of the provisions deal-
ing with jurisdiction of the probate court in section 7 is to define
the jurisdiction that cannot be taken away. The legislature can give
additional jurisdiction without limit. Under those circumstances, a
provision that the minimum jurisdiction specfied shall be "un-
limited" would appear to have little constitutional purpose.
55. 3 Holdsworth. History of English Law 585 (4th ed. 1935) see
Simes and Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America. 42
M[ich. L. Rev. 965 (1944).
56. Since this provision of the constitution would be self-executing.
the probate courts would be required to provide for jury trial immediately
after adoption of the amendment for any case or issue "in law" coming before
the probate court.
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Under the proposed amendment, the probate court is also to
have jurisdiction of "all guardianship and incompetency proceed-
ings." This is in keeping with past provisions and with the present
specific language of the 1954 amendment. It has been traditional
also in the United States, generally, to confer such jurisdiction on
probate courts although not necessarily by constitutional provi-
sionY- The serious question is whether this combination is so essen-
tial that it should be commanded by the constitution. Particularly
with respect to incompetency proceedings this is open to doubt.
Great strides have been made in the recognition of the nature and
treatment of mental illness and the legislature might properly
conclude that proper adjudication in this complex and important
medical field calls for skills found or to be provided in some other
court than the probate court. If so, it is difficult to see why the
constitution should prohibit the legislature from removing the juris-
diction from the probate court and placing it where the public
interest will best be served. Similarly, with the growing concern
over litigation involving the family-which is now spread over several
courts, the legislature may deem it in the public interest to establish
a family and children's court in which all this litigation would be
integrated and dealt with by a judiciary and staff skilled in this field.
The guardianship of minors should undoubtedly be included. It
may be that the legislature would deem it desirable and practical to
place responsibility for the family and children's court on the court
having jurisdiction over probate matters. But if it should decide
otherwise, it is difficult to see why it should be constitutionally pro-
hibited from acting accordingly. A separate family and children's
court, distinct from the probate court and which includes guardian-
ship of minors, cannot be said to be so unwise that under no cir-
cumstances should it be permitted.
The specification of the jurisdiction of the probate court may
create difficulties in the way of desirable solution of another prob-
lem. Presently, an issue litigated and determined in probate court
may be appealed to the district court for a trial de novo. The legis-
lature might well decide that all contested cases should go in the
first instance to the district court for trial and thus reduce the waste
of time and expense incident to double trials. This would not be
possible under the proposed amendment.
57. See Simes and Basye, The Organiasation of the Probate Court in
America, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 113, 130 (1944).
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Also in the larger centers, and even in rural districts, it might
be thought desirable to transfer the entire area of probate jurisdic-
tion to the district court. In Iowa and a number of other states this
has been done for the entire state and there is no probate court. This
has been advocated by eminent scholars of the subject :58
"The probate court should be the same court as the court of
general jurisdiction or should be a division of it. This does not
mean merely a unification of judges, such, for example, as is the
plan in certain counties in Ohio and Pennsylvania. It means a
a unification of courts. Indeed, this unification should be so com-
plete that, if, after a proceeding is begun, it is found to come
under the equity or common-law jurisdiction of the court, it can
be transferred to another docket of the court or to another divi-
sion, without beginning the proceeding anew. Only in this way
can be completely avoided the hardships incident to determining
where the shadowy, marginal line of probate jurisdiction is to be
drawn. The question of whether a given matter should be in
equity or in probate will cease to be one in which a slight misstep
on the part of the attorney may prejudice an innocent litigant.
Under the proposed amendment transfer of the entire area of
probate jurisdiction to the district court cannot be accomplished.
The foregoing observations point tip the major objection to the
proposed amendment with respect to local courts. It represents an
effort to carve out a limited jurisdiction and confer it upon a court
created for the purpose. In so doing, that court is placed beyond the
reach of legislation or other means of change short of another con-
stitutional amendment. This runs counter to the trend toward
greater flexibility in court organization which leaves the legislature
free to provide the kind of organization which a growing state with
shifting needs requires. There is an increasing feeling in Minnesota
that improvement in the organization of our local courts is needed.
The part time probate courts, and the part time and usually fee paid
justices of the peace and municipal courts are not rendering the
kind of justice the average citizen should have. Public and profes-
sional opinion has not crystalized as to the form the reorganization
should take. The county court similar to that proposed by the lTor-
ing plan is one solution offered. Expanding the jurisdiction of tile
probate court is another. Specialized courts such as the domestic
relations or family court or, short of that, a separate juvenile court.
have also been proposed. Under these circumstances, when consider-
ing a desirable solution it appears unwise to start with a probate
court with a constitutionally protected jurisdiction which cannot
be reduced or removed. It would have been better to follow the
58. Id. at 150.
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examples of New York," Michigan, 0 and Wisconsin" which give
their legislatures wide powers over the subjects. These states have
served as examples for Minnesota in many other fields of law. We
should have the same confidence in our legislature that they have
in theirs. The probate court should not be a constitutional court
with an irreducible jurisdiction of its own.
JUDGES
Term of Office. In the interest of simplification, the provisions
as to the terms of office of the judges of the various courts have been
reduced to a single section and a single term provided for all of
them. The term is for six years.62 This represents no change with
respect to supreme court and district court judges. It increases
the term of probate judges from four to six years. The present
-term of office for justices of the peace is two years6" and for other
courts created by the legislature such as municipal courts, the pres-
ent constitution does not designate a term. The desirability of in-
creasing the terms of justices of the peace and of lay fee paid muni-
cipal court judges and thus expanding the opportunity of those dis-
posed to predatory activities is open to question.
Qualifications. The only change in qualifiications for judges is
in the probate court. The proposed amendment would require them
to be "learned in the law."8 4 The present constitutional provision
appearing in the 1954 amendment is that the "qualifications may be
established by law." This difference probably has little practical
significance unless the legislature should desire to add to the qualifi-
cations of probate judges either because they also act as juvenile
59. "Surrogates and surrogates' courts shall have the jurisdiction, legal
and equitable, and powers now established by law until otherwise provided by
the legislature." N. Y. Const art. VI, § 13.
60. "In each county organized for judicial purposes, there shall be a
probate court. The jurisdiction, powers and duties of such courts and of thejudges thereof shall be prescribed by law, and they shall also have originaljurisdiction in all cases of juvenile delinquents and dependents." Mich. Const.
art. VII, § 13 (1908).
The requirement of a a probate court in each county seems unwise in so
far as it prevents the combining of counties to permit a single full time judge.
If the last clause means that juvenile court jurisdiction cannot be conferred
upon other courts and is more than an enabling provision, it is similarly
subject to the objections stated in the text.
61. "There shall be chosen in each county, by the qualified electors
thereof, a judge of probate ... whose jurisdiction, powers and duties shall be
prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the legislature shall have power
to abolish the office of judge of probate in any county, and to confer probate
powers upon such inferior courts as may be established in said county." Wis.
Const. art. VII, § 14.
62. Section 8 of the proposed amendment.
63. Minn. Const art. VI, § 8.
64. Section 7 of the proposed amendment
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court judges or because other jurisdiction is conferred upon them
requiring specialized talents. The language is open to the construc-
tion that no other qualifications can be added."'
Selection. The draft of the judiciary article prepared b~y tile
Loring Committee contained rather complete provisions incorporat-
ing the method of selection of judges in force since 1945 in Missouri
and known as the Missouri plan. ' Under this plan, when a vacancy'
in a judicial office occurs, a non-partisan judicial commission sub-
mits three names to the governor who appoints one of them to fill
the vacancy. After holding office for a limited period, the name of
the appointee is submitted to the electorate without a competing
candidate on the question: "Shall Judge be re-
tained in office ?" If a majority of the votes cast on the question are
in the affirmative, the appointee remains in office for a new and full
term. If the vote is in the negative, the process is repeated. A some-
what similar plan has been in operation in California since 1934.1
In both states the plan has operated with general satisfaction. It
has had vigorous sponsorship by the American Bar Association and
the American Judicature Society, but thus far it has not been
adopted in other states. 8
The 1947 Constitutional Commission approached this plan with
considerable caution and some abandonment of its principles. The
legislature was authorized to provide for the adoption of the plan
subject to the limitation that the first election of the appointee should
not be on his retention but should be a normal election open to com-
peting candidates. Subsequent elections of the successful candidate
would then be on the question of his retention. This modification
increases the security of the candidate once elected but does not
retain the safeguards of the Missouri plan with respect to the initial
selection.
The judiciary article, drafted by the Minnesota State Bar Asso-
ciation and following in most other respects the article prepared by
the 1947 Commission, removed all explicit provisions dealing with
the Missouri plan and retained only the section providing for elec-
tion of judges. In this form it was approved by the legislature for
submission to the electorate. It provides that all judges "shall be
65. See State ex rel. Boedigheimer v. Welter. 208 Minn. 338, 293 N. W.
914 (1940).
66. Mo. Const. art. V, § 29 (1945).
67. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 26.
68. For a view opposing the plan see Anderson, Reorganizing Minc-
sota's Judiciary-A Layman's View, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 383 (1943). The plan
is included in the Constitution of the Territory of Alaska, ratified April 24,
1956. See 39 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 175 (1956).
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elected in the manner provided by law by the electors of the state,
district, county, municipality, or other territory wherein they are
to serve." ,6 9
The phrase "elected in the manner provided by law" is new. An
argument can be made that it permits legislation adopting the
Missouri plan or some modification of it.7° Voting on the question
of retention in office might be deemed an election and the initial
appointment by the governor for a limited period as merely pre-
liminary to the election. Nevertheless, this is a strained construction
of the language used. Its natural meaning contemplates competing
candidates for the office and an election at which a choice between
them is made. That has been the meaning of "elected" heretofore.
The proposed words, "in the manner provided by law" ought to
mean only that legislation may prescribe the details and methods
of election. Thus, the phrase would permit laws prescribing whether
the election shall be bypartisan or non-partisan designation. It would
permit the "alley" plan of election whereby each judge of a multi-
judge court is considered a separate position and candidates must
designate for which position they seek election., It would permit
incumbants to be identified as such on the ballot.-- If more than this
is intended, and a plan of selection such as the Missouri plan is
authorized, it should have been specifically stated so that voters in
considering the adoption of the proposed article will be aware of it.
However desirable, a change of this importance should not come
about through the implication of some innocuous appearing words.
Vacancies in a judicial office are to be filled by appointment
by the governor as under the present constitution." However, a
desirable change has been made in increasing from 30 days to one
year the period of time which must elapse between the appointment
and the next general election at which the appointee's successor is
elected. This will enable the public to become better acquainted with
the appointee, who usually is a candidate to succeed himself, and it
69. The language is patterned on Article VI, section 9, of the present
constitution which reads: "All judges other than those provided for in this
Constitution shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district, county,
or city, for which they shall be created... ." State ex rel. Rosckes v. Dreger,
97 Minn. 221, 106 N. AV. 904 (1906), should continue to be applicable not-
withstanding the change in wording. In this case, the county-wide jurisdic-
tion of the Municipal Court of Minneapolis was sustained, although thejudges of the court were elected by the voters of the City of Minneapolis only.
70. See Howard, Proposed Amendment to Article VI of the Constitu-
tion, 13 Bench & Bar of Mirm., No. 4, p. 13 (1956).
71. See Gustafson v. Holm, 232 Minn. 118, 44 N. W. 2d 443 (1950).
72. Ibid.
73. Minn. Coast. art. VI, § 10.
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will avoid the embarrassing situations which arise when a vacancy
occurs after the primary election has taken place but more than 30
days remain before the next general election.
Retirement. No one is more tenacious in his belief in his own
competence than an aging judge. Unless some provision is made
for his retirement the administration of justice in too many in-
stances will suffer at the hands of a judge of declining ability. Here-
tofore, in this and most other states the assumption has been that
the judge will retire on his own volition if provided with a retire-
ment compensation that will permit him to do so. Accordingly many
states, including Minnesota,7 4 provide retirement allowances on cer-
tain conditions being fulfilled such as reaching a designated age
and service on the bench for a given period of time. This, however.
frequently does not induce a judge eligible for the allowance' to
retire. Usually the retirement compensation is substantially less
than his salary. But even when equal to his salary, as in the federal
system, judges continue on beyond the age of retirement, even
though in many instances it would be to their advantage and that
of the court if they would give up the reins to younger men. I ence.
in some states, retirement at a specific age is made compulsory hy
constitutional provision. In Minnesota, the problem has been pal.-
tially met in the case of the district court judge by withholding
retirement allowances if a judge does not retire within one year
after becoming eligible to do so."
Another problem arises when a judge beconies disabled fr(,in
performing his duties. Legislation usually provides for his retire-
ment with compensation upon a determination of his disability.";
The present constitution contains no provision on the subject.
The proposed judiciary article authorizes legislation on the ,ubject
and "for the extension of the term of any judge who shall bet'tine
eligible for retirement within three years after expiration of the
term for which he is elected.";7 This provision is designed to l'rilit
legislation which will protect the judge whose term will expire
before he becomes eligible for retirement and is compelled 1o run
again for another term if he is to receive the benefits of the retire-
ment laws. Another provision permits a retired judge to continue
judicial work under such conditions as may le specified by law.
74. See Minn. Stat., c. 490 (1953).
7.5. Minn. Stat., § 490.102 (1953).
76. See Minn. Stat., §§ 490.04-.12 (1953).
77. The draft of the 1947 Constitutional Commission pr ovildti fmf
Compklr).rv retirement at the age of 70.
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CONCLUSION
The proposed judiciary article contains a substantial number of
desirable improvements over the present constitution. But, in gen-
eral, it represents a conservative and limited advance. In a few in-
stances serious problems of interpretation are introduced. With
respect to the three major needs of court organization existing in
this state, the article is a disappointment. These are the need for
an effective administrative organization of the courts, the reorgani-
zation of the local court structure, and substitution of court appoint-
ment for the present election of clerks of district court. On the
whole, a modem and satisfactory solution to the problems of court
organization in this state is not to be found in the proposed judiciary
article. But still, it represents some advance-and some advance is
probably better than none at all.
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